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The problem 
 
The production and use of written texts in classical Greece began to increase rapidly around 
the early fifth century B.C.E., and accelerated tremendously during the course of the fifth 
and fourth centuries. Complete illiteracy must have been common in the early fifth century, 
but much less so in the late fourth. During a period of barely two centuries literacy had 
become wide-spread, so one can reasonably and fruitfully ask what transformations of 
thought and expression this entailed. 
 The situation in India is entirely different. We are in no position to determine a 
period of two centuries during which literacy became an inalienable part of society, so that 
the effects of this change might then be studied. We do know approximately when writing 
began to be used in India, but we do not know how wide-spread its use then was. The 
surviving literature, though voluminous, rarely mentions reading and writing, and where it 
does, it sometimes does so in order to give expression to the inferior status of these 
activities. A number of texts were handed down orally, as some are to this day, and it is 
hard to find out exactly which texts fell into this category at any particular period. The 
Brahmins, sometimes referred to as the literate caste, were in reality primarily ritual 
specialists who knew their sacred texts by heart. They could accomplish their ritual tasks 
without literacy, and there can be no doubt that many learned Brahmins were strictly 
speaking illiterate. In this situation it is not easy to study the effects of literacy. 
 In this article I will concentrate on a feature that has been claimed by some to have 
arisen in India independently of literacy, viz. rationality. The discussion of rationality and 
its relation to literacy in Indology has been inspired by the anthropologist Jack Goody who, 
in a number of publications has presented a ‘great divide’ theory, not specifically for India, 
but for all societies that pass from an oral to a literate stage.1 Goody did his own field-work 
among the LoDagaa of Northen Ghana, where he recorded — the first time in writing, later 
using a tape recorder — the recitation of their Bagre myth. Based on this experience, and 
                                                
1 For Goody on rationality, see esp. Goody, 1996, chapters 1 and 2. 
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on the analysis to which the resulting corpus was subjected, Goody arrived at certain ideas 
with regard to orality which he considers generally valid. 
 
Ordinary memorisation versus Vedic memorisation 
 
A number of Indologists have reacted to Goody's ideas and pointed out that his conclusions 
cannot be extended to India without major adjustments. Beside ordinary memorisation, 
India knows an altogether different kind of memorisation, viz. Vedic memorisation.2 This 
kind of memorisation appears to be unique in the world, and must, in India itself, be strictly 
distinguished from other forms of memorisation. Vedic memorisation, which a youngster 
acquires in his teens or even earlier, uses special techniques to make sure that no syllable of 
the text committed to memory be lost.3 Understanding the content of what is learnt by heart 
is not part of this training,4 and is sometimes claimed to be a hindrance rather than a help. 
 Memorising the Veda in this manner goes hand in hand with the refusal to write 
down these texts. This at any rate is what the Persian traveller al-B¥rËn¥ maintained in the 
eleventh century in the following often cited passage:5 “The Brahmins recite the Veda 
without understanding its meaning, and in the same way they learn it by heart, the one 
receiving it from the other. Only few of them learn its explanation, and still less is the 
number of those who master the contents of the Veda and their interpretation to such a 
degree as to be able to hold a theological disputation. ... They do not allow the Veda to be 
committed to writing, because it is recited according to certain modulations, and they 
therefore avoid the use of the pen, since it is liable to cause some error, and may occasion 
                                                
2 Goody's ideas on the Vedas can be found in Goody, 1987, chapter 4. 
3 See e.g. Staal, 1961. 
4 Aithal, 1991: 11; see also the passage from al-B¥rËn¥ cited below. Kane (HistDh II, 1 p. 348) claims: “Even 
in the 20th century ... there are hundreds of bråhmaˆas who learn not only the whole of the Ùgveda ... by 
heart, but also commit to memory the pada text of the Ùgveda, the Aitareya Bråhmaˆa and Óraˆyaka and the 
six Vedå∫gas (which include the 4000 aphorisms of Påˆini and the extensive Nirukta of Yåska) without 
caring to understand a word of this enormous material.” And Bühler claimed in the 19th century (1886: xlvii): 
“A perfect Vaidik of the Óßvalåyana school knows the Rig-veda according to the Saµhitå, Pada, Krama, Ja†å 
and Ghana På†has, the Aitareya Bråhmaˆa and the Óraˆyaka, the ritualistic SËtras if Óßvalåyana, Íaunaka's 
Pråtißåkhya and the Íik∑å, Yåska's Nirukta, the grammar of Påˆini, the Vedic calendar or Jyoti∑a, the metrical 
treatise called the Chandas, Yåjñavalkya's Dharmaßåstra, portions of the Mahåbhårata, and the philosophical 
SËtras of Kaˆåda, Jaimini, and Bådaråyaˆa. Similarly the Vaidiks of the Yajus, Såman, and Atharvan schools 
are able to recite, more or less perfectly, the whole of the works of their respective Íåkhås as well as some 
other non-Vedic books. But it would be in vain to expect from such men an explanation of the literary 
treasures which they possess.” Unfortunately Kane does not tell us how thoroughly the other texts (different 
from the Ùgveda) are being memorised, and nor does Bühler specify how many perfect Vaidikas there were in 
his time. My own very limited dealings with one of the most respected Vedic reciters around Poona, Pandit 
Kinjawadekar Shastri (cf. Bronkhorst, 1982: 79), taught me that his knowledge of the Ùgveda and its pada- 
and kramapå†ha was absolutely stunning, but that this same traditional scholar (who did indeed admit not to 
understand the contents of what he recited) had difficulties with a passage from the Aitareya Óraˆyaka (or 
was it the Upani∑ad?) which I asked him to recite. 
5 Al-Biruni, India, p. 58-59. 
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an addition or a defect in the written text. In consequence it has happened that they have 
several times forgotten the Veda and lost it ... [N]ot long before our time, Vasukra, a native 
of Kashmir, a famous Brahmin, has of his own account undertaken the task of explaining 
the Veda and committing it to writing. He has taken on himself a task from which 
everybody else would have recoiled, but he carried it out because he was afraid that the 
Veda might be forgotten and entirely vanish out of the memories of men, since he observed 
that the characters of men grew worse and worse, and that they did not care much for 
virtue, nor even for duty.” Some Brahmanical sources would seem to state the same.6 
Several centuries before al-B¥rËn¥ the Chinese pilgrim Yijing wrote:7 “The Vedas have been 
handed down from mouth to mouth, not transcribed on paper or leaves.” The means at our 
disposal confirm that Vedic memorisation has been, and still is, highly efficacious. A 
number of Vedic texts appear to have been preserved in this manner for countless 
generations without any deviation from the original.8 
 Since Vedic memorisation plays a crucial role in some of the arguments to be 
considered below, I will cite a passage from the introduction to a recent book by K. 
Parameswara Aithal, who here describes what he has learnt by visiting numerous 
accomplished Vedic reciters. Aithal depicts the method of teaching in the following manner 
(1991: 12): 
 
"In the early stages the procedure is somewhat like this: The young boys who have 
had their initiation (upanayana), sit in front of the teacher after they have finished 
their purificatory baths an performed the daily rituals, etc. The teaching begins early 
in the morning, soon after sunrise, with the chanting of the sacred syllables HARIfi 
OM, as prescribed by the Veda-lak∑aˆa texts. First the teacher recites each mantra, 
påda (= quarter) by påda, and the pupil recites it three times immediately after the 
teacher. This påda by påda recitation is repeated twelve times. The same method is 
followed for the recitation of the halves of the mantra-s and for the full mantra-s. 
Usually one session lasts until one adhyåya is completed. Altogether each mantra is 
repeated 108 times. The study of the pada, krama, ja†å, etc., is variously graded 
                                                
6 Aitarya Óraˆyaka 5.3.3, which is often cited in this connection, does not appear to concern writing; see Falk, 
1992. Kumårila Bha††a's Tantravårttika (6th or 7th century C.E.) on M¥måµså SËtra 1.3.7 (p. 123 l. 20-21) 
contains the following statement: yathaivånyåyavijñåtåd vedål lekhyådipËrvakåt / ßËdreˆådhigatåd våpi 
dharmajñånaµ na saµmatam // ... “Just as no knowledge of dharma is accepted [to arise] from the Veda if it is 
not properly mastered, if writing etc. have preceded it, or if it has been studied by a ÍËdra.” See further 
Malamoud, 1987. 
7 Tr. Takakusu, 1896: 182. 
8 Cp. Witzel, 1995: 91: “We can actually regard present-day Ùgveda-recitation as a tape recording of what 
was first composed and recited some 3000 years ago.” Note however that Renou (1960: 41 n. 1) provides 
some information that suggests that writing the Veda was not altogether unknown in relatively early days: “La 
Påˆ[in¥ya] Íik∑å 32 (= Yåjñ[avalkya] Íi[k∑å] 198) (Ghosh, 1938: 72; JB) moque les récitateurs qui utilisent 
un texte écrit, les likhitapå†haka (en même temps que les anarthajña); la Når[ad¥ya] Íi[k∑å] 2.8,19 s'élève 
également contre celui qui lit. Le [Mahåbhårata] 13.23,72 vulg. (= Mhbh 13.24.70; JB) juxtapose les vedånåµ 
lekhakå˙ avec les corrupteurs (dË∑aka) et les vendeurs du V[eda] (vedavikrayin).” Further passages that 
discourage the use of writing are referred to in Kane, HistDh II.1 p. 348-349. 
LITERACY AND RATIONALITY  4 
 
 
according to the ability of the individual student. The procedure is very strenuous 
and time-consuming and thus requires great patience. Since no material reward, nor 
any kind of professional prospect can be expected from such a study these days, 
firm faith in the spiritual efficacy and divinity of the Vedic Word is the essential 
prerequisite for such a rigorous course of study." 
 
The existence of this unique form of Vedic memorisation, which is without known parallels 
elsewhere, appears to be uncontroversial among Indologists. It primarily concerns Vedic 
texts, and is not easily transferred to other texts, not even to other holy texts. This is 
illustrated by descriptions such as the one by C. J. Fuller, from which we learn (1984: 138; 
cited Goody, 2000: 17) that pupils at a school in Tamilnadu that is under the overall control 
of the Kanchipuram Ía∫karåcårya's monastery learn passages from traditional Ógamas “by 
memorising exactly the passages recited to them by their teachers. It is considered vital that 
these passages' words, pronunciation and scansion are all memorised absolutely accurately, 
and this cannot be done by reading books. ... Only when a passage has been fully 
memorised does the teacher explain its meaning.” In spite of this imposed discipline these 
traditional Ógamas are not being preserved by an exclusively and uninterrupted oral 
tradition.9 The school just mentioned was founded in the early 1960s, and one of its 
teacher's concerns is that many pupils forget much of what they have learnt after returning 
to work in their temples; not even the refresher courses run by the school can prevent this. 
It is not impossible that medical texts were memorised in a similar manner, whether with 
more success we do not know. One of them, the Sußrutasaµhitå, describes the process as 
follows:10 “At the time of study the teacher should teach the pupil according to his capacity 
pada, påda or ßloka. And those padas, pådas and ßlokas should be arranged in order (?, 
krameˆa), and thus one should combine them one by one.” This passage shows some 
similarity with texts describing the teaching of Vedic texts, but it is too short to derive 
definitive conclusions from it. 
                                                
9 Cp. Fuller, 1999: 52: “In principle, the teaching method is entirely oral ... Nevertheless, students do have 
copies of the texts they are learning, and — rather like actors learning their lines — they often refer to the 
words on paper to help them memorise them. ... All the gurus insist that oral instruction is indispensable and 
that memorisation is far more important than understanding. .. [The students] mainly learn a series of 
relatively short passages from the manuals ... of Aghorasiva or other preceptors ...” 
10 Sußrutasaµhitå 1 (SËtrasthåna), 3.54: ... adhyayanakåle ßi∑yåya yathåßakti gurur upadißet padaµ pådaµ 
ßlokaµ vå, te ca padapådaßlokå bhËya˙ krameˆånusandheyå˙, evaµ ekaika¥ßo gha†ayed. Falk (2001: 196) 
paraphrases and comments: "teaching proceeds either in pådas, half-stanzas of full stanzas depending on the 
capacity of the pupil. After that the taught portions are to be combined one by one. Unfortunately, the process 
referred to by krameˆa is not described in full." Scharfe (2002: 261) translates te ca padapådaßlokå bhËya˙ 
krameˆånusandheyå˙ as “and these words, quarters and stanzas should be step by step paraphrased”. 
LITERACY AND RATIONALITY  5 
 
 
 As stated above, not all memorisation in India is of the Vedic kind.11 Goody (2000: 
13-14) draws attention to a study by John D. Smith (1991) of the Rajasthani epic of PåbËj¥. 
Smith (1991: 26) points out that the epic of PåbËj¥ has “a degree of textual fixity that seems 
not to be known in other oral epic traditions”, but this does not change the fact that the 
differences between the performances by different performers are considerable (pp. 25-26). 
Indeed, Smith is of the opinion that “[t]here is some reason to suppose that the epic as 
performed at the present day actually is more stylised, more ‘flat’, than at an earlier period 
— in other words, that there has been an actual shift away from a differentiated narrative 
and towards greater and greater uniformity” (p. 24). It may here be added that the reciters 
of this Rajasthani epic learn their text, along with other skills, by practice only, with no 
formal preceptor (p. 39). Interestingly, Smith's chief informant maintained that the oral 
transmission was a secondary development from an original written form (pp. 18-19). 
However that may be, Smith's study reminds us that memorisation of the Vedic kind and 
memorisation of the ‘ordinary’ kind are strictly to be kept apart, even in India. Colas (1999: 
38) illustrates the same contrast with the help of two classical texts: “les transmissions 
orales qui ... véhiculèrent [ces deux textes] furent de nature très différentes. Le premier 
texte est le Ùgveda, transmis oralement et sans corruption pendant vingt-cinq siècles, grâce 
à un ensemble de mnémotechniques réservées à certains groupes de brahmanes: la fidélité 
de l'oralité védique surpasse alors de loin celle de la transmission écrite. À l'opposé, l'autre 
texte, l'épopée du Mahåbhårata ..., a fluctué au gré de la récitation des bardes, il foisonne en 
fautes grammaticales et défie les méthodes modernes de l'édition critique.” 
  
Påˆini 
 
As already indicated, Goody connects rationality with literacy. The term ‘rationality’ is 
notoriously vague, and there will be occasion to say more about it below. At this point it is 
important to mention that ancient India has left us a remarkably sophisticated intellectual 
composition, the famous grammar of Påˆini; many scholars consider this grammar to be a 
manifestation of rationality if ever there were one. Indeed, they like to recall that the 
linguist Leonard Bloomfield (1933: 11) called it "one of the greatest monuments of human 
intelligence". Some Indologists use Påˆini's grammar to criticize the very notion that the 
development of rationality is intimately linked to the appearance of literacy. One of them is 
Frits Staal, who has published articles with titles such as “The fidelity of oral tradition and 
                                                
11 For a study of a large number of oral epics in India see Blackburn et al., 1989. 
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the origins of science” (1986) and “The independence of rationality from literacy” (1989). 
Staal believes that we are “under the sway of cultural prejudices” including “the prejudice 
that writing is more reliable and therefore better than memory” (1986: 27). 
 In the publications just mentioned, Staal concentrates on two areas of early Indian 
thought, both of which he considers sciences: the science of ritual and the science of 
grammar.12 Both are historically linked to Vedic recitation and memorisation: the science of 
ritual because Vedic recitation takes place during the ritual, and the science of grammar 
because it deals, among other things, with the sandhi between words. (Vedic recitation 
distinguishes two versions of the recited texts, the saµhitåpå†ha and the padapå†ha; the 
former is the version with sandhi, the latter the one without it.) Staal, however, goes further. 
The Vedic tradition of transmission, he states (1986: 27/275), “has led to scientific 
discoveries that are of enduring interest and from which the contemporary West still has 
much to learn”. Staal is not content with the assertion that this tradition of transmission was 
merely an interesting object of study; he is convinced that these sciences were somehow 
part of that tradition, that they arose from within it. More specifically, he believes that 
Påˆini’s grammar was composed without the help of writing.  
 Staal is well enough acquainted with Påˆini's grammar to know how extraordinarily 
complex it is. He cites earlier scholars who were puzzled by this, but points out that in 
many cases “the at first sight puzzling order of Påˆini's rules enables him to make 
generalizations that would fail to be captured otherwise” (1986: 270). This obliges Staal to 
think of a way in which Påˆini could have composed this complex grammar without the use 
of writing. He suggests two solutions. The first is: Påˆini was an extraordinary genius. 
Realising that this solution may not find favour with all his readers, Staal then proposes the 
following explanatory scenario (Staal, 1986: 36-37/284-285): 
 
“Påˆini worked in close collaboration with some colleagues or, more likely, pupils. 
Let us assume, for example, that he had more or less completed the rules of vowel 
sandhi, and provisionally formulated these in a consistent manner and to his 
satisfaction. Now there appears a problem elsewhere in the grammar; and the only 
way in which it can be given a simple solution is by inverting two of the sandhi 
rules he had just formulated. Immediately a host of problems arise, and the rule 
system begins to generate ungrammatical forms. How to save it, safely modify and 
keep track of it without losing the thread? 
 The solution is simple: Påˆini asked his favorite pupil to memorize the rules 
for vowel sandhi he had provisionally formulated. He turned his attention 
elsewhere, and returned to effect the required inversion. The student who was given 
the special assignment heard it, and knew precisely how to react to it by 
reformulation. Other pupils who had memorised other portions of the grammar were 
                                                
12 For the science of ritual as conceived of by Staal, see Staal, 1982. 
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eagerly listening in order to find out how any proposed modification would affect 
their domain; and if trouble arose, they immediately took steps to overcome the 
problem by changing the rules, their order, their formulation, or whatever else had 
to be changed. This led to revisions elsewhere in the grammar, supervised and 
synthesized by Påˆini himself. There are many ad hoc devices for patching up rules 
that must have been resorted to on such occasions and that can in fact explain 
certain oddities that we meet with in the corners of Påˆini's grammar.” 
 
I have quoted this passage at length because it plays, and has to play, an essential role in 
Staal's argument, and in that of all those who maintain that Påˆini's grammar is the product 
of an exclusively oral culture. 
 Staal’s reflections find support, at least at first sight, in subsequently published 
studies about writing in ancient India. Harry Falk’s Schrift im alten Indien (1993) is widely 
regarded as the definitive study on this subject. It shows that all the literary indications that 
had been taken to prove the use of writing before the period of emperor Aßoka (ca. 268-233 
B.C.E.) do no such thing. Moreover, Falk maintains that the inscriptions of Aßoka 
themselves show that writing was new, and underwent important improvements during the 
realm of the emperor itself. In other words, writing was not introduced into India until just 
before, or during, the reign of Aßoka. Falk adds that the script used in Aßoka’s inscriptions 
is insufficiently refined phonologically to be used for Sanskrit; this adaptation occurred 
several centuries later, according to Falk. 
 It is no surprise that Falk subscribes to Staal’s position to the extent that Påˆini’s 
grammar must have been composed orally, without any use whatever of writing. Indeed, 
Falk states in an article (1990: 110) that it is our fault, not Påˆini’s, that it is difficult for us 
to imagine how such an intricate system could have been developed without writing. 
 Here, I submit, Falk goes too far. It is fair to expect that we believe that Vedic 
memorisation — though without parallel in any other human society — has been able to 
preserve very long texts for many centuries without losing a syllable. The evidence in 
support of this is strong, and the determined sceptic can, still today, visit traditional Vedic 
scholars and test the extent and the precision of their mastery of the texts concerned. 
However, the oral composition of a work as complex as Påˆini’s grammar is not only 
without parallel in other human cultures, it is without parallel in India itself.13 It would have 
to be regarded as a totally unique event, in India and in the world, and here the least one can 
                                                
13 Cf. Malamoud, 1997: 105-06; 2002: 148: “Mais peut-être faut-il distinguer entre ce que requiert la 
composition d'un texte et les caractéristiques qui facilitent sa transmission. Il est certain que les SËtra, par de 
tout autres moyens que la poésie, sont conçus pour être confiés à la mémoire. Mais l'enchaînement de ces 
_fils_, surtout de ceux qui tissent la grammaire, suppose de la part des auteurs une prévision de tous les détail 
de l'ensemble, une mémoire raisonnante, une puissance intellectuelle dont on voit mal comment elles 
pourraient se déployer sans le secours de l'écriture.” 
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ask for is some kind of indication as to how Påˆini did it. It just will not do to state that our 
difficulty in conceiving any such thing is our problem.14 Staal understood this. The 
credibility of his position, and that of Falk, is intimately linked to the plausibility of his 
explanation. 
 Mention must here be made of Jan E. M. Houben's observations (1999: 34 ff. § 4.6; 
2001: 171 n. 9) to the extent that Påˆini's grammar is not primarily or exclusively a 
testimony to the intelligence and genius of a single author. Rather, Påˆini formed part of a 
tradition of grammar-authors plus an educated public that made use of those grammars. The 
result is that Påˆini cannot have been all that extraordinary, for had he been, no one would 
have appreciated his work, no one would have learned it and made use of it, no one would 
have transmitted it. Houben may be right in all this, yet his observations throw no new 
light, as far as I can see, on the question as to how Påˆini's grammar may have been 
composed without the help of writing.  
 In this context it is only appropriate to point out that Påˆini, far from being totally 
unfamiliar with writing, is generally accepted (also by Falk) to be the first Indian author to 
unambiguously refer to it.15 It is true that the brevity of his reference does not allow us to 
determine with certainty what kind of writing he was referring to. Hinüber (1990: 57) 
suggests Kharo∑†h¥ or Aramaic but prefers the former; Falk (1993: 258-259) argues that it 
must have been Aramaic, a script used exclusively by a professional class of writers in the 
service of the Achaemenid empire. Aramaic was not used or understood by anyone outside 
this caste of writers, certainly not by Brahmins. Falk's is a possible interpretation of 
Påˆini’s reference to lipi ‘script’, but clearly not the only one. 
 To this must be added that, thanks to the work carried out by Hinüber (1990: 34-35) 
and Falk (1993: 303-304), we now know that Påˆini lived, in all probability, far closer in 
time to the period of Aßoka than had hitherto been thought. According to Falk’s reasoning, 
Påˆini must have lived during the decennia following 350 B.C.E., i.e. just before (or 
contemporaneously with?) the invasion by Alexander of Macedonia. Indeed, in a more 
recent publication Falk (1994: 327 n. 45) considers it credible that Påˆini may have lived 
under the Mauryas, and therefore (until) after the invasion of Alexander. It is moreover 
generally agreed that Påˆini lived in the north-west of the Indian subcontinent, probably in 
what is now Pakistan. 
                                                
14 All Falk says is (1990: 110): “Before Påˆini perfected the system there were many generations in different 
parts of the subcontinent working on it and it is impossible to reconstruct the steps or to estimate the span of 
time needed to lead to such an end.” 
15 Hinüber (1990: 57) mentions a passage in the Råmåyaˆa (1.12.6) which may have contained lipikara, the 
word known to Påˆini, in the meaning ‘painter’ rather than ‘writer’, but this can hardly have been the meaning 
known to Påˆini. 
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 Falk and those who agree with him like to cite the evidence from Megasthenes who, 
around 300 B.C.E., recorded that no writing was used in India. Megasthenes’ evidence, 
which seems to be reliable, may apply to the heartland of India, primarily the capital 
På†aliputra of the Maurya empire to which he had been sent as ambassador by Seleucus 
Nicator. It is an altogether different question whether Megasthenes’ testimony can be taken 
to be valid for the north-west of the subcontinent, which was part of Seleucus’ empire. 
Indeed, Nearchus’ earlier testimony confirms the existence of writing in the parts of the 
subcontinent which he visited with Alexander.16 Påˆini, as we have seen, lived in those 
parts. 
 Regarding the early history of writing in India the following passage from Richard 
Salomon's recent book Indian Epigraphy must be cited, which refers to various other 
publications.17 This passage reads (1998: 12): 
 
“[A] new body of material has recently come to light that seems to support the older 
theory that Bråhm¥ existed before Mauryan times, that is, in the fourth century B.C. 
or possibly even earlier. This is a small group of potsherds bearing short 
inscriptions, evidently proper names, which were found in the course of excavations 
at Anurådhapura, Sri Lanka in strata which are said to be securely assigned by 
radio-carbon dating to the pre-Mauryan period. Various dates have been proposed 
for these graffiti, ranging from the sixth to the early fourth century B.C. The more 
recent publications on the subject have tended to favor the later date within this 
range, but in any case, these inscriptions still seem to show that Bråhm¥ did indeed 
predate the Mauryan period.” 
 
Salomon cautions his readers to be careful, and he is no doubt right in doing so. 
Nevertheless, the findings he refers to suggest that the script Påˆini knew may have been 
Aramaic, Kharo∑†h¥, or an early form of Bråhm¥, or indeed any two or even all three of 
these.18 
 There is another element that may be important in this connection. It was pointed 
out above that the science of grammar deals, among other things, with the sandhi between 
words, and that it is sandhi which distinguishes two versions of the recited Vedic texts, the 
saµhitåpå†ha and the padapå†ha. Often the padapå†ha — i.e. the version without sandhi, in 
which words are kept separate from each other — is stated to have resulted from a concern 
                                                
16 So Goyal, 1985: 82-100. Hinüber (1990: 21) considers it probable that Nearchus referred to Aramaic 
writing. 
17 Deraniyagala, 1992: II: 739-750; Allchin, 1995: 163-181 & 209-216; Coningham, Allchin, Batt and Lucy 
1996: 76-77. 
18 Hinüber (1990: 55 f.) expresses surprise about the fact that the Maurya empire introduced two completely 
different scripts (Kharo∑†h¥ and Bråhm¥) at the same time. He comes to the conclusion that Kharo∑†h¥ is older 
than Bråhm¥. This conclusion may need reconsideration in the light of the new discoveries in Sri Lanka. 
LITERACY AND RATIONALITY  10 
 
 
to preserve the saµhitåpå†ha. Stated generally, this does not appear to be correct. In the 
case of the Ùgveda we know that its padapå†ha is older than Påˆini (who refers to it), 
whereas the saµhitåpå†ha is younger than this grammarian (application of Påˆini's rules to 
the padapå†ha occasionally gives rise to metrically correct results where the saµhitåpå†ha 
does not preserve the original metre), perhaps younger than Patañjali (ca. 150 B.C.E.).19 
That is to say, the padapå†ha (as we have it) is older than the saµhitåpå†ha (as we have it). 
This fact by itself does not explain that the padapå†ha of the Ùgveda preserves some archaic 
features which it should have lost in the course of being handed down. One example must 
here suffice. The padapå†ha of the Ùgveda contains forms like nirnij, with two dental 
nasals, where the saµhitåpå†ha and all later Sanskrit literature replace the second dental 
with retroflex ˆ: nirˆij. Retroflection is known to have entered the Indo-Aryan languages 
rather late, but early enough to affect all our sources. It is therefore surprising to find forms 
without the obligatory retroflection in the padapå†ha of the Ùgveda, which it should have 
undergone like all other Sanskrit texts. A solution that has been suggested is that the 
padapå†ha was originally, and perhaps for some time, the written form of the Ùgveda;20 the 
habit to write words separately, without sandhi, is after all wide-spread. Being written 
down, the Ùgveda padapå†ha may conceivably have missed out on some developments that 
touched the oral version of this same text. This solution may not be without difficulties 
itself (cp. Bronkhorst, 1989: 306; Hinüber, 1990: 18 n. 36) and has to be treated with much 
caution, yet it cannot be totally discarded as long as no better explanation has been found. 
 Falk is aware of these features of the Ùgveda padapå†ha and of their importance in 
the debate about writing in ancient India. His book Schrift im alten Indien promised to deal 
with them in extenso in a separate publication (1993: 250). The intended article has recently 
come out (Falk, 2001). It contains an interesting, though speculative, account of the origin 
of the saµhitåpå†ha and padapå†ha of the Ùgveda, in which it is postulated that these two 
versions at some time in the past drifted apart, to get reunited again afterwards. No word is 
said about the archaic features of the padapå†ha mentioned above, and one must perhaps 
assume that the period of separate development is to be held responsible for the differences 
between the two versions (even though Falk does not say so).21 The question whether this 
explanation (if it is one) is better than the one it must replace remains open. 
                                                
19 See Bronkhorst, 1981; 1987: 55-56; 1991: 75 f. Both the padapå†ha and the saµhitåpå†ha of the Taittir¥ya 
Saµhitå, and the final version of the Atharvaveda (Íaunak¥ya and Paippalåda), appear to be younger than 
Patañjali; see Bronkhorst, 1987: 55. 
20 Bronkhorst, 1982a. 
21 One might then also have to assume that the padapå†ha was preserved in a more western area than the 
saµhitåpå†ha, where language was less affected by retroflection; see Deshpande, 1995: 74, with references to 
Mehendale, Bloch and Burrow.
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 Summing up, it is an open question whether Påˆini used writing in composing his 
grammar. If he did, it may well be that we owe this much admired piece of scholarship to 
that fact. But perhaps he didn't. The very uncertainty that surrounds the first use of writing 
by Indian scholars obliges us to refrain from drawing any far-reaching conclusions. 
 
The Mahåbhå∑ya 
 
Falk is less inclined to refrain from drawing such conclusions. According to him, neither 
Påˆini, nor indeed his earliest surviving commentators Kåtyåyana and Patañjali used 
writing. It is worth our while to briefly review some of his arguments. Consider the 
following:22 
 
“Wie P. Thieme 1935 ausführlich dargelegt hat, gab es keine ununterbrochene 
mündliche Tradition von Påˆini zu Kåtyåyana und Patañjali. Zwischen Autor und 
Kommentatoren war das Wissen um Akzentuierung und Nasalierungen einzelner 
SËtras verloren gegangen. Thieme erklärte die Verluste als Produkt einer Schrift, die 
wohl Zeichen für Vokale und Konsonanten aufwies, aber noch keine für Akzente 
und Nasalierung (122 ff.). Wäre dem so, dann hätte schon dem Vårttikakåra ein 
Manuskript vorliegen müssen, das ihn durch seine Unvollständigkeit verunsichert 
hätte. Doch sprechen weder Kåtyåyana noch Patañjali jemals von einem 
Manuskript. Sie erwähnen keine Lesarten, keine abgebrochenen Ränder oder 
verblassten Buchstaben.” 
 
Falk does not express disagreement with Thieme's position that the oral tradition linking 
Påˆini with Kåtyåyana and Patañjali had been interrupted. But if this oral tradition had been 
interrupted, what else but a written tradition could have saved Påˆini's grammar from total 
perdition? Falk suggests the following: “die mündliche Tradition folgte ähnlichen 
Prinzipien wie die vedische, die über den Wechsel von saµhitåpå†ha- zu padapå†ha-
Rezitation jeglichen Kontakt zur ursprünglichen Diktion der Ù∑is verloren hatte”. However, 
accents have been very well preserved in oral Vedic recitation; only the nasalisation of Ë◊, 
preserved in the padapå†ha, has been lost in the saµhitåpå†ha. Furthermore, Falk's remarks 
to the extent that neither Kåtyåyana nor Patañjali mention manuscripts, variant readings, 
etc. loose their force in the light of more recent authors, who certainly did use writing, but 
never mentioned any of these things.23  
 Falk then continues (p. 267): 
 
                                                
22 Falk, 1993: 266-267. 
23 For some examples, see Bronkhorst, 1991a: 212 f. 
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“In Anbetracht dessen, was heute über die Verwendung der Schrift für Sanskrit 
bekannt ist, erscheint es völlig undenkbar, dass schon um 250 v.Chr. (angeblich: 
Kåtyåyana) oder um 150 v.Chr. (etwas sicherer: Patañjali) ein phonetisch derart 
raffinierter Text wie die A∑†ådhyåy¥ schriftlich fixiert werden konnte. Es fehlten zu 
jener Zeit immer noch Doppelkonsonanz, viråma, visarga, velarer Nasal, den man 
für die A∑†ådhyåy¥ unbedingt hätte entwerfen müssen, da er hier und in keinem 
anderen Sanskrit-Text als Phonem erscheint. ...  
 Der Zustand der Bråhm¥ zur Zeit der Íu∫gas, die Natur des Textes und vor 
allem das Schweigen der beiden frühen Kommentatoren zu jeder Form von 
Schriftlichkeit verlangt zwingend nach der Erklärung, dass Påˆinis Text, ebenso wie 
die Vårttikas und wohl auch das Mahåbhå∑ya selbst, ganz und gar den Bedingungen 
oraler Tradition folgten.” 
 
It is a pity that Falk does not discuss the consequences of his position. The Mahåbhå∑ya is 
as long as, if not longer than, the Ùgveda.24 A complete memorisation of the Ùgveda, 
including its Padapå†ha and Kramapå†ha, “extends to more than eight years, with ten to 
twelve hours of learning each day” according to K.P. Aithal (1991: 12), as cited by Falk 
(1993: 323). There is no evidence that I know of suggesting that even half that time (or for 
that matter: any time at all) was ever reserved for memorising the Mahåbhå∑ya in the Vedic 
style (as opposed to studying it; don't forget the fundamental difference between Vedic and 
other forms of memorisation.) The Mahåbhå∑ya itself complains that ‘nowadays’ students, 
having studied the Veda, are in no hurry to study Påˆini's grammar.25 It is hard to believe 
that those same uninspired students would learn Påˆini's grammar plus another text the size 
of the Ùgveda by heart. 
 Yijing's remarks on the Sanskrit grammarians would at first sight seem to be in 
disagreement with the above. A closer inspection shows that this is not the case. Yijing, as 
has been shown in detail by John Brough (1973), made a number of serious mistakes in his 
account of Sanskrit grammatical literature, confusing both authors and texts. It seems 
nevertheless clear that he knew (or had heard of) the Mahåbhå∑ya, which he knew by the 
                                                
24 The Ùgveda, according to Gonda, 1975: 9, contains 165.007 words. A low estimate of the number of words 
in the Mahåbhå∑ya — 1412 pages in Kielhorn's edition, each containing on average some 200 words — 
comes to a total that is higher than that. (The length of the Mahåbhå∑ya is said to be 36.000 granthas, i.e., 
36.000 x 32 = 1.152.000 syllables; see Bhågavata, 1999: Upodghåta p. 09.) 
25 Mahå-bh I p. 5 l. 6-11: puråkalpa etad ås¥t: saµskårottarakålaµ bråhmaˆå vyåkaraˆaµ smådh¥yate / tebhyas 
tatra sthånakaraˆånupradånajñebhyo vaidikå˙ ßabdå upadißyante / tad adyatve na tathå / vedam adh¥tya tvaritå 
vaktåro bhavanti: vedån no vaidikå˙ ßabdå˙ siddhå lokåc ca laukikå˙ / anarthakaµ vyåkaraˆam iti / tebhya 
evaµ vipratipannabuddhibhyo 'dhyet®bhya åcårya idaµ ßåstram anvåca∑†e: imåni prayojanåny adhyeyaµ 
vyåkaraˆam iti / “In olden days it was like this: brahmins studied grammar after their (initiation-)ceremony. 
After they had learnt the different places of articulation, the articulatory organs and the extra-buccal process 
of articulation, they were taught the Vedic words. Nowadays, it is not like this. Having learnt the Veda [the 
students] are quick to say: ‘the Vedic words are known [to us] from the Veda, and the ordinary words from 
common speech. [So] grammar is useless.’ To those students entertaining false notions the teacher teaches this 
science [of grammar] saying: ‘these are the uses, [therefore] grammar must be studied.’” (tr. Joshi and 
Roodbergen, 1986: 68; modified) 
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name CËrˆi, but which he failed to distinguish from the vårttikas which it contains. 
Confusingly, he appears to use the expression V®ttisËtra for the vårttikas, but ascribes far 
too great a length to this text (18'000 ßlokas), which he seems to believe to have been 
studied independently from the CËrˆi. This great length is no doubt to be explained by the 
fact, pointed out by Brough, that Yijing was unable to discriminate between the vårttikas 
and the Mahåbhå∑ya. This leaves us with the question what Yijing may have precisely been 
referring to when mentioning the duration of studying this text. However that may be, he 
says the following about it (Takakusu, 1896: 175): “Boys of fifteen begin to study this 
commentary, and understand it after five years. ... All these books (?) should be learnt by 
heart. But this, as a rule, applies only to men of high talent, while for those of medium or 
little ability a different measure (method) must be taken according to their wishes. They 
should study hard day and night, without letting a moment pass for idle repose.” About the 
CËrˆi he says (p. 178): “Advanced scholars learn this in three years.” 
 It has to be repeated that Yijing's remarks have to be read with much caution. But 
assuming his testimony about the way of studying grammatical texts to be by and large 
correct, there is an obvious contrast with the way he described Vedic learning, which we 
already considered above. About the latter he says (p. 182): “The Vedas have been handed 
down from mouth to mouth, not transcribed on paper or leaves. In every generation there 
exist some intelligent Brâhmans who can recite the 100,000 verses.” He says no such thing 
about grammatical texts. In other words, these grammatical texts were not exclusively 
handed down from mouth to mouth. Indeed, Yijing makes a point of stating that less 
talented students would not learn them by heart at all. The long duration required for 
studying the Mahåbhå∑ya (three years? five years? eight years?) can be explained by the 
great complexity of its contents, not necessarily by the effort needed to learn it by heart. 
Yijing's account contains no hint that the Mahåbhå∑ya was ever studied the Vedic way. 
 If we now return to the question of scripts, it is hard for me, not being a specialist, to 
see how Falk can be sure that the Bråhm¥ script at the time of the Íu∫gas could not yet be 
used for Sanskrit, since practically all our early evidence is in other languages than 
Sanskrit. With the growing popularity of Sanskrit or ‘Epigraphical Hybrid Sanskrit’ as 
inscriptional languages all the necessary characters (®, au, ∫a, ˙, and halanta or viråma) as 
well as consonantal clusters appear in the inscriptions (Salomon, 1998: 37).26 It is not 
                                                
26 Hinüber (1990: 61) appears to consider it significant that the Lalitavistara, where it enumerates the list of 
Bråhm¥ signs, skips the letter ®. This same list does however contain ai, au, and ∫a; see Lal(V) p. 89. It is to be 
kept in mind that the list in the Lalitavistara is used to inculcate some important truths with the help of words 
or expressions that have the sound concerned in the first or second place (a: anitya˙ sarvasaµskåra[˙]; å: 
åtmaparahita; etc.). In such a list there is no place for ˙ and halanta / viråma, and perhaps not for ® (the 
Sanskrit index to the Abhidharmakoßabhå∑ya — Abhidh-k-bh(Hi) — contains just nine entries beginning with 
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evident that this must imply that these or similar characters may not have been used in 
Sanskrit non-inscriptional writing well before these inscriptions. To this may be added the 
‘überraschende Tatbestand’ (Hinüber, 1990: 61) that Bråhm¥ has ligatures which serve no 
purpose in the Middle-Indic languages for which it is used; ligatures are of course essential 
for Sanskrit.27 
 It is important to insist once again on the difference between Vedic memorisation 
and other forms of memorisation. Many of the non-Vedic feats of memorisation 
enumerated in Falk's chapter “Berichte vom Umfang des Memorierten” (1993: § 14.1, pp. 
321 f.) concern either texts that have been handed down in rather widely differing versions, 
thus showing the unreliability of this method of memorisation (cf. Falk, 1993: 322: “Häufig 
mussten sich die Chinesen mit lückenhaften [buddhistischen] Texten zufrieden geben, weil 
ihren Gäste das eine oder andere Kapitel aus dem Gedächtnis geschwunden war”); or texts 
that could at any time be corrected with the help of their written versions. (The recent 
discovery of Buddhist manuscripts in north-west India from perhaps the beginning of the 
first century C.E. suggests that the Buddhist texts that were memorised may have had 
written versions from an early date onward; see Salomon, 1999.) The Mahåbhå∑ya is 
different: it is a highly technical text which appears nonetheless to have been preserved in a 
form that hardly deviates from the original.28 
 
Systematic philosophy 
 
I have concentrated so far on Påˆini's grammar because it is probably the most ‘intelligent’ 
composition from the late-Vedic period that has survived (“one of the greatest monuments 
of human intelligence”, as we have seen). Writing can help in composing particularly 
complex works, even though we do not know whether it did in the case of Påˆini. Writing 
can have other effects, too. It allows readers access to works that do not belong to their own 
tradition. There will be a limit to the extent of what even the best memoriser can memorise, 
and to what he will be willing, or allowed, to memorise. It is difficult to believe that people 
                                                                                                                                               
®, none of which may have been suitable). It is furthermore not clear that this enumeration of sounds concerns 
specifically the Bråhm¥ script. In this context it may be of interest to note that the Kharo∑†h¥ script of one of 
the recently discovered early Buddhist manuscripts from Gandhåra has a sign for ® (i.e. for k®; see Salomon, 
1999: 123). 
27 Cp. Colas, 1997: 127: “la finesse de l'analyse phonétique dont témoignent les premières écritures indiennes 
(attestées au IIIe siècle avant notre ère) trahit l'intervention des érudits mêmes qui déconsidéraient l'écrit. Le 
bon sens suggère donc que ces clercs employèrent l'écriture plus tôt que le IIIe siècle avant notre ère, peut-être 
dans des manuscrits utilisés comme aide-mémoire.” On p. 129 Colas expresses his view that the first Indian 
writing systems must have been created in the circle of grammarians or under their influence. 
28 See in this connection Bronkhorst, 1987a: 14-42 ("The text history of the Mahåbhå∑ya"). 
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put much effort into memorising texts which they looked upon as heretical, wrong, or 
dangerous. 
 It seems undeniable that Påˆini was familiar with a considerable portion of Vedic 
literature, going well beyond any one Veda.29 So was his commentator Patañjali.30 This 
circumstance might be used to argue for the existence of written Vedic texts at the time of 
these linguists, but this would not be a particularly strong argument. Representatives of 
different Vedas were in contact with each other (one needs several of them to execute a 
sacrifice), and it is conceivable that they provided each other with suitable examples to 
illustrate, say, specific grammatical rules. 
 However, it was no doubt much harder to gain access to texts belonging to 
altogether different, even hostile, traditions. This happened in an intellectual development 
that began some time after Påˆini, and which distinguishes itself in an essential manner 
from the development that led to his classical grammar. Let me try to explain what the 
difference consists in. 
 It has already been pointed out that Påˆini's grammar is a very intelligent piece of 
work. It does not however challenge generally accepted opinions, as far as we can tell. 
Even though modern scholarship has been fascinated by, and therefore often has 
concentrated on, its comparison with modern linguistics, studies that deal with the 
intellectual background of Påˆini's grammar reveal a fundamental continuity with late-
Vedic thinking.31 This fits in with the general picture in which Påˆini, and perhaps other 
grammarians before him, organised and systematised ideas which were generally accepted, 
rather than providing a total break with what preceded. 
 Some time after Påˆini such a break — or rather: a number of them — did take 
place in Indian thinking. In the various schools of what is commonly called classical Indian 
philosophy revolutionary new ideas came up, quite suddenly it appears, which did 
constitute radical breaks with what preceded. Buddhist thinkers all of a sudden denied the 
existence of phenomenal reality, sometimes going to the extent of claiming that no Buddha 
exists or ever existed. Certain Brahmanical thinkers — most notably the Vaiße∑ikas — 
came up with most remarkable analyses of reality, maintaining for example that a pot and 
its two halves constitute three different entities. Others argued that nothing ever comes into 
existence, and that future entities exist already in their material causes. The most orthodox 
defenders and interpreters of the Veda, the M¥måµsakas, came to deny the very existence 
                                                
29 Bronkhorst, 1991. 
30 Rau, 1985; to be used along with Bronkhorst, 1987. 
31 Bronkhorst, 1981; 1999: 12-17. 
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of the Vedic gods and claimed, more generally, that practically nothing in the Veda is to be 
taken literally. This list could easily be extended. For our present purposes it is most 
important to see that something dramatic happened to an important number of Indian 
thinkers, not to all at the same time to be sure, but yet during a rather limited period of a 
few centuries. 
 One of the great tragedies of Indian intellectual history is that little is known of the 
details of these momentous changes. Only rarely can we associate a revolutionary 
development with one or more concrete individuals. We know even less about the 
circumstances that set these changes going. However, it seems certain that they had much 
to do with the fact that the thinkers concerned had to defend their points of view in 
encounters with opponents who totally disagreed with them. The opposition between 
Buddhists and Brahmins appears to have been particularly important in all this, but 
oppositions between schools within these and other movements were important, too. 
Thinkers were obliged to defend their points of view, because they might be summoned by 
the regional ruler to confront a star speaker from a competing school. As a result they made 
their position as coherent as possible, and removed, suppressed or de-emphasised any 
feature that would appear problematic to a critical outsider. If one understands rationality to 
mean, or imply, openness to criticism (freely accepted or imposed) in all areas,32 the case 
could be made that the early Indian philosophers, who had to deal with critics who would 
not grant them an inch, are at least as much if not more entitled to the qualification 
‘rational’ than Påˆini.33 
 It is important to add some specifications to the above. Debates between proponents 
of different currents of belief or practice took place long before the beginning of classical 
Indian philosophy. We can be sure that early Buddhism and Jainism, for example, being 
missionary movements, did not eschew meetings and discussions with others. The early 
Buddhist canon preserves memories of such encounters, and the descriptions there found of 
early Jainism, to take this example, turn out to be fairly reliable. Yet neither early 
Buddhism nor early Jainism felt obliged to improve its own position as a result of such 
meetings. They did not need to, because there was no one to reward the winner and punish 
                                                
32 This is easily misunderstood. Houben, for example, criticises this notion in the following words (2001: 170 
n. 8): “there may very well be areas of reality which, for the thinkers involved, are fundamentally beyond 
critical inquiry”. This may indeed be true for individual thinkers, but that is not the point. The point is that in a 
rational tradition thus conceived, the enemies and opponents of thinkers will be free to criticise issues which 
for the latter are beyond critical inquiry, and that the thinkers criticised will yet have to listen and respond to 
this criticism. A rational tradition can in this way be understood as a social phenomenon, not as a description 
of the habits of thought of individual thinkers. 
33 For an elaboration of this idea of rationality and references, see Bronkhorst, 1999a: 5 f. 
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the looser in such informal debates. This, however, appears to have changed in subsequent 
centuries. We know that in classical India kings might oblige representatives of different 
movements to participate in public debates, in which much — e.g. the life or freedom of the 
participants, or the well-being of their movement — might be at stake. Public debates of 
this kind have no doubt inspired authors to compose the manuals of debating skills that 
come into existence during the first centuries of the Common Era. And these same kinds of 
public debate appear to have inspired thinkers to revise and improve their positions, thus 
creating the schools of classical philosophy. It seems however likely that beside these 
public debates informal debates continued to be held. After all, the Buddhists and the Jainas 
were still interested in making converts, and for this purpose discussions with as yet 
unconverted people are necessary. 
 We are informed about the classical debates mainly through the reports of foreign 
visitors; two examples will here be briefly presented. The Chinese Buddhist pilgrim 
Xuanzang has left us a detailed account of his visit to India in the first half of the seventh 
century of the Common Era. In this account he regularly mentions debates between 
representatives of different schools of thought. The debates he refers to normally took place 
in the presence of a king, and tended to end in victory for one of the two parties, and defeat 
for the other. According to the biography of Xuanzang composed by his pupil Huili, 
Xuanzang himself volunteered to participate in a debate on one occasion. The event is 
described as follows:34 
 
“At that time a heretic of the Lokåyatika school came to seek a debate and wrote his 
argument in fourteen points, which he hang on the door of the monastery, while he 
announced, ‘If anybody is able to refute any one point of my argument, I shall cut 
off my head to apologize!’ 
 After the passage of several days, nobody came out to accept the challenge. The 
Master [= Xuanzang] then asked his personal servant to take down the poster, 
destroy it, and trample the broken pieces under his feet. Being greatly enraged, the 
Brahmin asked, ‘Who are you?’ The servant said in reply, ‘I am a servant of the 
Mahayana-deva.’ The Brahmin, who had already heard of the fame of the Master, 
was ashamed of himself and did not say anything more. The Master sent for him and 
brought him to the presence of the Venerable Í¥labhadra [Xuanzang's teacher of 
Nålandå Monastery], with various virtuous monks as witnesses, to start a debate 
with him about the principles of his school and the theories founded by other 
heretical sects as well.” 
 
At this point Xuanzang starts to criticise various heretical schools, among them the two 
Brahmanical schools of philosophy called Såµkhya and Vaiße∑ika, but not, surprisingly, 
                                                
34 Li, 1995: 132 f. (modified) 
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the Lokåyatika school. Only his criticism of the Såµkhya school is given in some detail. 
The text then continues: 
 
“In this manner the argument was carried on with repeated refutations; and the 
Brahmin remained silent and said nothing. Then he rose to his feet and said with 
apology, ‘I am defeated, and I am ready to keep my word.’ The Master said, ‘We 
Buddhists do not take any man's life. I now make you my slave, and you should 
work according to my orders.’ The Brahmin was glad to obey the Master's orders 
with reverence, and was brought to his living quarters. All those who heard about 
this event praised it with delight.” 
 
It is unlikely that this passage accurately presents what happened. It is hard to believe that a 
Brahmin who was seeking a debate would accept total defeat without as much as uttering a 
word. But nor would we expect historical accuracy in a document that primarily sings the 
glory of Master Xuanzang. It will be interesting to see what kind of arguments supposedly 
led to his victory in debate. 
 The text does not offer much in terms of arguments, with one notable exception. 
The Master is supposed to have dealt with the Såµkhya system of thought in a rather more 
detailed manner. First he presents an outline of the system, which agrees with what we 
know about it. After this exposition he draws attention to what he considers its lack of 
coherence. It is not clear why a follower of the Lokåyatika school should have wished to 
defend ideas belonging to the altogether different Såµkhya school of thought. Xuanzang's 
exposition and refutation of the Såµkhya position can therefore hardly have been part of 
his debate with his hapless opponent. Nor is it likely that a real Såµkhya would have felt 
defeated by the reflections brought to bear on their system by the Chinese pilgrim. It is yet 
interesting to see that Xuanzang is here depicted as presenting what is an accurate 
description of the main features of the Såµkhya philosophy, and that, having presented this 
outline, he tries to show its inner incoherence. The fundamental assumptions of this 
philosophy do not, according to the position attributed to Xuanzang, justify the functions it 
ascribes to the various entities it postulates. 
 Accounts like this are extremely interesting, and give us a glimpse, if ever so faint, 
of situations India's philosophers may have been familiar with. In the present context we 
have to limit our reflections to one issue: How did Xuanzang know so well the system of 
his opponent? It seems extremely unlikely that he had been trained by one of them. It is 
much more likely that he had studied their texts, either alone or with the help of a Buddhist 
teacher. Indeed, Xuanzang himself reports that Såµkhya and various other non-Buddhist 
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topics were taught at the Buddhist university of Nålandå.35 It seems safe to conclude that 
intellectual confrontations like the one involving Xuanzang could not have taken place, at 
least not in this form, without access to written documents; and indeed, the extensive use of 
reading and writing at his period is not controversial. But what do we know about the 
debates that took place many centuries before Xuanzang? And what did the participants in 
those debates know about the views of their opponents? We will return to these questions 
below. 
 First we turn to our second example, which is situated a few centuries before the 
time of Xuanzang. It depicts a debate between a Buddhist and a Såµkhya in which, this 
time, the latter is victorious. The story is found in Paramårtha's The Life of Vasubandhu. 
The main character is the Såµkhya teacher Vindhyavåsa, who modified the Såµkhya 
doctrine and came to think that the doctrine set forth by him was the greatest, and that 
nothing could be superior to it. However, Buddhism was flourishing in the world at that 
time. Vindhyavåsa therefore resolved to refute it. The text continues:36 
 
“Accordingly he went to the country of Ayodhyå and beat the drum of dispute with 
his head and said: 
(The translator of this passage explains in a note that, according to a commentator, ‘it 
was customary for a king in India to keep a drum at the Royal Gate. When a man 
wants to appeal to the Court or to challenge a dispute, he has to beat it.’) 
‘I will dispute (with any Buddhist Íramaˆa). If I am defeated my opponent shall cut 
my head off; but if, on the contrary, he is beaten, he shall give me his head.’ The 
King, Vikramåditya ..., being informed of the matter summoned the heretic and asked 
him about it, whereupon the latter answered: ‘Thou art, O King, the Lord of the Land, 
in whose mind there should be no partial love to either Íramaˆas or Brahmins. If 
there be any doctrines prevailing (in thy country) thou shouldst put them to the test 
(and see whether) they are right or wrong. Now I intend (to dispute) with a disciple of 
Íåkya-muni [= the Buddha] to determine which party is the winner or the loser. Each 
should vow to stake his own head.’ The King thereupon gave him permission and 
despatched men to ask all the Buddhist teachers of the country in the following 
words: ‘Is there anyone who is able to oppose this heretic? Whosoever thinks himself 
competent should dispute with him.’ 
 At that time the great Teachers of the Law, Manoratha, Vasubandhu, and others 
were all absent travelling in other countries. ... 
 There was at home only Buddhamitra the teacher of Vasubandhu. ... This Teacher of 
the Law was formerly very learned, but he was now advanced in years and therefore 
weak in mind and feeble in his speech. He said: ‘Now the great champions of the 
Law are all abroad. The heretic is strong and obstinate and must not be let alone any 
longer. I will now see to it myself.’ He informed the King, who appointed a day on 
which he summoned a great assembly to the hall of discussion, where the heretic 
and the Buddhist teacher were to meet and dispute. 
                                                
35 Joshi, 1967: 127, 
36 Takakusu, 1904: 283 f. Cp. the discussion in Larson & Bhattacharya, 1987: 131 f. 
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 The heretic said: ‘Will you first set forth your opinion? Or will you refute the 
opinion first set forth by me?’ The priest replied: ‘I am like a great ocean which 
swallows up all that comes. You are like a lump of earth which will be submerged if 
it comes to the ocean. You may do as you like.’ His opponent said: ‘Then you had 
better set forth your own opinion (first). I will refute it.’ 
 The Buddhist teacher, thereupon, set forth his doctrine of impermanence and said: 
‘All composite things are in process of destruction every moment, why? because 
they disappear in the end.’ He further supported this by various arguments. The 
heretic opponent could repeat all these arguments of the Buddhist priest after once 
hearing them and began to criticise them one by one by processes of reasoning. On 
being requested to commit to memory and repeat these refutations the priest failed 
to do so. He could not even re-construct his own arguments, though requested to do 
so. 
 Thus the Buddhist priest was completely defeated. The heretic said: ‘You are a 
Brahmin by caste and I also am a Brahmin. We are not allowed to kill. I will beat 
you on the back instead, in order to show that I am the victor.’ He did so. The king 
gave him three lacs of gold as a prize. On receiving the gold he distributed it among 
the people at large and returned to the Vindhya mountain where he entered a rocky 
cave.” 
 
The story has a happy ending after all, for Vasubandhu, after his return, composed a work 
criticising the Såµkhya doctrine in such a competent manner that the heretics had nothing 
left for them to fall back upon. In this way, without meeting Vindhyavåsa, Vasubandhu 
took full vengeance on him and wiped off the disgrace put upon his teacher. 
 
These examples show that loosing a debate could have serious consequences. It is not 
surprising that debating manuals were produced, some of which have survived. Public 
debates had to be won, and all possible means were used in order to attain that goal. This 
included trickery, but also straightforward, and soundly based, criticism of each other's 
positions. It is this aspect of the debate tradition which has no doubt exerted a more lasting 
influence. Criticism directed at others and criticism received from others had the 
unavoidable effect that all participants in these debates straightened out their own positions. 
Incoherent or inconsistent views might not survive scrutiny, not by an opponent in debate, 
but neither by the thinker who did not wish to be exposed by those who disagreed with him. 
 This process of improving and systematising the own position becomes visible, 
perhaps for the first time, in a scholastic development of Buddhism during the centuries 
preceding the Common Era. Buddhist scholasticism of that period, called abhidharma, has 
mainly survived in two bodies of texts, belonging to two schools of Buddhism. One of the 
two, belonging to the Theravåda school of Buddhism, shows an ongoing refinement, but 
little or no attempt to develop a coherent system of thought. Such an attempt characterises 
the other school, Sarvåstivåda, several texts of whose canonical “Basket of scholasticism” 
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(abhidharma-pi†aka) testify to the innovations made in this domain. Since the innovations 
concerned were made on the basis of traditional material, the result is often quite complex, 
and this is not the place to deal with them in full detail.37 Only some striking features must 
here be mentioned. The Sarvåstivåda conception of the world is essentially atomistic. The 
macroscopic, and therefore composite, objects which we are acquainted with from everyday 
experience do not really exist. What really exist are the ultimate constituents, called 
dharmas. A particularly important composite object is the human person which, too, does 
not really exist. The atomistic understanding of the world also finds expression in the belief 
in momentariness: nothing exists for more than a single moment.38 Various questions linked 
to this atomistic vision of the world are raised and often answered by introducing an 
appropriate dharma. The question, for example, how different bundles of dharmas stick 
together so as to form different persons (remember that persons do strictly speaking not 
exist), is answered with the introduction of a dharma called pråpti ‘possession’. Other 
difficulties were connected with the belief that mental events occur only one at a time in 
one person. This leads to difficulties in the case where someone observes, say, his own 
desire. This activity involves two mental events, the observation and the desire, which 
cannot simultaneously exist. When the observation is present, the observed desire must of 
necessity be non-present. Observation of a desire is therefore only possible if a non-present 
object (the desire) exists. The Sarvåstivådins concluded from this that past and future exist. 
This particular view, incidentally, is responsible for their name, Sarvåstivåda, the “position 
(våda) according to which everything (sarva) exists (asti)”. Sarvåstivåda, as will be clear 
from this very brief presentation, made a major effort to rationalise its teachings, Theravåda 
did not. Sarvåstivåda played a major role in the tradition of debate that came to involve all 
schools of philosophy, whether Buddhist, Brahmanical, or Jaina; it seems even likely that 
the Sarvåstivådins were the first to adhere to this tradition of debate in India. Theravåda 
played no such role, and indeed left India before this tradition of debate had attained a 
prominent position. 
 The marginal role of Theravåda Buddhism is illustrated by one of the earliest 
surviving texts in India dedicated to criticising the positions of others. This text is the 
Kathåvatthu “Text dealing with disputes”, according to tradition composed 218 years after 
the death of the Buddha (Hinüber, 1996: 70 f.), and belonging precisely to the Theravåda 
branch of Buddhism. It criticises in its oldest portions a position which we know was held 
                                                
37 For a slightly more detailed, but still very incomplete, presentation, see Bronkhorst, 2000: 76-127. 
38 Momentariness is not explicitly mentioned in early Sarvåstivåda Abhidharma texts, but this position can 
quite safely be attributed to their authors; see Bronkhorst, 1995. 
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by the Sarvåstivådins, mentioned earlier. An analysis of the criticism presented in the 
Kathåvatthu shows that its author had not understood, and had perhaps no knowledge 
whatsoever of, the arguments used by the Sarvåstivådins to justify their position. The 
Sarvåstivådins held that past and future exist, and their argumentation, as we have seen, 
was built on their fundamental belief that no two mental events can simultaneously occur in 
one person. The author of the Kathåvatthu presents instead an argument that is totally 
nonsensical.39 
 The Kathåvatthu, then, is a text which criticises the position of others without being 
properly informed about it (at least in this case). No wonder that its uninformed criticism 
carried little weight. The Sarvåstivådins did not, and did not need to, change their views as 
a result of the criticism expressed in this Theravåda text. What is more, the Theravådins felt 
no need to tighten up their own views and develop them into a coherent whole. 
 
All this takes us back to the question of writing. One may not necessarily need to know 
writing in order to debate, nor for producing a well-constructed argument, or for seeing the 
weakness in the position of someone else. However, to destroy the position of one's 
opponent, one has to know that position. If the opponent belongs to a tradition altogether 
different from one's own — as is the case in a confrontation between a Brahmin and a 
Buddhist — knowledge of the other's texts is unlikely to be part of one's own curriculum. In 
such cases the most obvious way of gaining access to the position and defensive arguments 
of one's opponent is to study the texts which the opponent himself has read. (Other ways are 
possible, but no doubt rare: according to legend, the Brahmanical thinker Kumårila had in 
his youth joined a Buddhist monastery in order to gain deep knowledge of the doctrines he 
was going to criticise; cp. Hulin, 2001: 24.) 
 For much of the history of Indian philosophy there can be no doubt that the main 
participants in the ongoing debate read the writings of their opponents. Authors criticise 
each other and show considerable familiarity with the writings of their worst enemies. For 
this part of the history of Indian philosophy the importance of writing cannot be doubted. 
 To illustrate the extent to which at least certain philosophical authors were 
acquainted with the literature of their opponents, I refer to a passage in the Nyåyavårttika of 
Uddyotakara, a commentator who wrote around the year 600.40 In this passage Uddyotakara 
criticises the Buddhist doctrine of No-Self (anåtman). One of the arguments he presents is 
that the Buddhists, by believing this, go against their own sacred texts. At this point 
                                                
39 Bronkhorst, 1993. 
40 For details, see Bronkhorst 1996. 
LITERACY AND RATIONALITY  23 
 
 
Uddyotakara cites a text which it is not possible to locate in the surviving versions of 
Buddhist SËtras. But apparently the cited passage was not well-known to the Buddhists in 
Uddyotakara's time either, for he says: “Don't say that this is not Buddha word; it occurs in 
the Sarvåbhisamaya SËtra.” Apparently Uddyotakara had made extensive searches in the 
sacred literature of his opponents, so much so that he had unearthed a passage that few 
Buddhists knew. 
 
We have to address the question whether classical Indian philosophy came about as a result 
of acquaintance with writing. Is it possible that it would not have come about without it? 
Questions like these are difficult to answer. Most of the earliest surviving philosophical 
texts present their own system and pay little explicit attention to other philosophies. It 
seems safe to maintain that they had become interested in systematising their own position 
and removing inconsistencies because they felt threatened by other thinkers. But one can be 
criticised by others without knowing the details of their positions. What is more, one can 
criticise the positions of others without knowing those positions all that well. 
 We have seen that the Kathåvatthu illustrates this. It criticises other positions, but in 
the one case where we can check what it is doing we find that it had not at all understood 
the position it criticises. Not seeing the inner coherence of the views it criticises, the 
Theravåda tradition apparently did not feel the need to increase the coherence of its own, as 
the Sarvåstivådins had done. There is a great temptation to conclude that the Theravådins 
had no access to the texts of their opponents. This in its turn might be interpreted to mean 
that they did not yet use writing at that period. But was the situation different for the 
contemporary Sarvåstivådins? 
 Unfortunately this is far from clear. It seems likely that the Vaiße∑ika philosophy 
arose under the influence of Sarvåstivåda thought (Bronkhorst, 1992), but it is not clear 
how much in-depth knowledge of that Buddhist school was required in order to be familiar 
with its main theoretical presuppositions; the Vaiße∑ika SËtra (the oldest text of this school) 
may in any case be too young to be of importance in this discussion. The same may be true 
of the Nyåya SËtra. The early Sarvåstivåda texts that have been preserved do not as a rule 
speak of the positions of others. However, a Gandhari manuscript fragment from the first 
century C.E. (which is being prepared for publication by Collett Cox) contains parts of a 
polemical, non-Sarvåstivåda, Abhidharma text which criticises alternative positions, most 
notably the Sarvåstivåda. Alternative views are also mentioned in he Mahåvibhå∑å, a 
voluminous commentary which may have been composed, in its earliest form, in the first 
half of the second century C.E. This text does not only mention the deviating opinions of 
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other Sarvåstivådins, also rival schools of Buddhism receive coverage, as do a variety of 
non-Buddhist schools.41 Unfortunately it seems that the information we find in this text 
about non-Buddhist schools is minimal, so much so that no certain conclusions can be 
drawn about the acquaintance of its authors with the texts of their non-Buddhist rivals. This 
question is in need of further study as far as the Mahåvibhå∑å is concerned,42 but it is clear 
that other early Sarvåstivåda texts, including the Abhidharmah®daya,43 the 
Saµyuktåbhidharmah®daya,44 and even Vasubandhu's much more recent 
Abhidharmakoßabhå∑ya45 tell us very little about rival non-Buddhist schools. The text 
which is partially preserved in the so-called Spitzer manuscript (third century C.E. at the 
latest), on the other hand, contains frequent references to “non-Buddhist literature and 
topics, e.g., the Mantras, Bråhmaˆas and Upani∑ads, arthaßåstra, kåmaßåstra, Råmåyaˆa, 
Mahåbhårata, the kalås, etc., and notably to the non-Buddhist philosophical schools of 
Såµkhya and Vaiße∑ika” (Franco, 2000: 558 ([53])). Familiarity with the doctrines of 
different schools is also attested in the poem called “Acts of the Buddha” (buddhacarita) by 
the Buddhist author Aßvagho∑a, who belonged to the first centuries of the Common Era. 
This poem contains a description (and criticism) of the Såµkhya philosophy which seems 
to be well informed.46 It also contains indications suggesting that its author was acquainted 
with Vaiße∑ika.47 Regarding Aßvagho∑a, Johnston observed (1936: II: xviii): “he had an 
acquaintance, so wide that no parallel can be found to it among other Buddhist writers, with 
all departments of Brahmanical learning, including some knowledge of the Veda and ritual 
literature as well as mastery of all the sciences a kavi was expected to have studied.” 
However, this may not be evidence for the accessibility of all this learning to non-
Brahmins, but rather for the opposite, viz., that Aßvagho∑a was born a Brahmin and had 
been given a Brahmin's education; this is indeed what the Chinese tradition maintains. For 
familiarity with Brahmanical philosophical learning on the part of a Buddhist author we 
have to turn to Någårjuna, whose Vaidalyaprakaraˆa and Vigrahavyåvartan¥ betray 
thorough knowledge of the NyåyasËtra.48 All this information about other schools in these 
works may not, however, be of much help, since it seems unlikely that anyone would 
seriously maintain that the Mahåvibhå∑å and the poems of Aßvagho∑a, not to speak of the 
                                                
41 EIP VII, pp. 110-111 (R.E. Buswell and P.S. Jaini). 
42 Cp. Willemen, Dessein, Cox, 1998: 239 (Såµkhyas, Vaiße∑ikas, Lokåyatas, Íabdavådins). 
43 Willemen, 1975. 
44 Dessein, 1999. 
45 See the indexes in Abhidh-k-bh(Hi) and Abhidh-k(VP) VI; cp. Bronkhorst, 1997. 
46 Cp. Ramakrishna Rao, 1964; Kent, 1982. 
47 Bronkhorst, forthcoming. 
48 Bhattacharya, 1977; Lindtner, 1982: 87 f.; Bronkhorst, 1985; Oetke, 1991: 44 f.; Tola & Dragonetti, 1995; 
Meuthrath, 1999. 
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works of Någårjuna, were composed orally: with these texts we have no doubt entered the 
age of literacy.49 
 And yet, even in an age of literacy information may be difficult to obtain. 
Qvarnström (1999: 172) paints the following depressing picture: 
 
“[T]here were no public libraries, no public centers of education or information. 
Philosophical systems were, so to speak, private property. To learn something about 
the ‘exoteric’ views of an opponent one might attend or participate in a public 
debate (våda).” 
 
This picture is no doubt too bleak. Hinüber (2001: 359), referring to Qvarnström's remarks, 
draws attention to the Vinaya of the MËlasarvåstivådins, which stipulates that when books 
are left by testament to the Buddhist order, the Buddhist books should be kept and given to 
the library, whereas books belonging to other ßåstras should be sold.50 This rule would 
make no sense if there were no readers who read books belonging to different philosophical 
and scientific traditions. 
 
* * * 
 
Conclusions 
 
The conclusions to be drawn from the above reflections cannot but be disappointing. It may 
be that writing played a role in the composition of Påˆini's grammar, but we don't really 
know. It may be that literacy, and access to the writings of thinkers belonging to different 
schools, made possible the intellectual revolution that created classical Indian philosophy, 
but once again, we cannot be sure.51 All we know is that the subsequent development of 
classical Indian philosophy depended upon access to the written documents not only of the 
own school, but to those of others as well. 
 
 
 
                                                
49 It is in this context interesting to recall that the (Mahå-)Vibhå∑å is familiar with the numerical place-value 
system (Bronkhorst, 1994). 
50 Gilgit Manuscripts vol. III part 2, p. 143 l. 5-7: pustakånåµ buddhavacanapustakå avibhajya cåturdißåya 
bhik∑usaµghåya dhåraˆako∑†hikåyåµ prak∑eptavyå˙ / bahi˙ßåstrapustakå bhik∑ubhir vikr¥ya bhåjayitavyå˙ / 
51 The extent of the interaction between different schools of thought during the centuries preceding the 
Common Era is often underestimated; see Bronkhorst, forthcoming a. 
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